Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.004zbMath1278.91037OpenAlexW1982563929MaRDI QIDQ665083

Michalis Drouvelis, Wieland Müller, Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsignalinglearningequilibrium selectioncommon prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

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