Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
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Publication:665090
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002zbMath1278.91024OpenAlexW2004965319MaRDI QIDQ665090
Yuval Heller, Tristan Tomala, Eilon Solan
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf
Games in extensive form (91A18) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (2)
Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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