The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
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Publication:665096
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.004zbMath1279.91042OpenAlexW3124821818MaRDI QIDQ665096
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.004
History, political science (91F10) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (11)
Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ The fragility of information aggregation in large elections ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility ⋮ Sincere voting in large elections ⋮ Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory ⋮ When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
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- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
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