Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.006zbMath1279.91024OpenAlexW2090744939MaRDI QIDQ665097

Akira Okada, Toshimasa Maruta

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrepeated gamesprisoner's dilemmagroup formationrenegotiationnoncooperative coalitional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games ⋮ Campaigning internally or externally

Cites Work

• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Starting small and renegotiation
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

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