Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
From MaRDI portal
Publication:665102
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009zbMath1279.91123OpenAlexW2134997704MaRDI QIDQ665102
Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009
Related Items
Constrained random matching ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange ⋮ Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
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