On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
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Publication:665105
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.003zbMath1279.91039OpenAlexW3124790690MaRDI QIDQ665105
Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4559/1/MPRA_paper_4559.pdf
Related Items (4)
Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities ⋮ On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors
Cites Work
- On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
- Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Strong uniform times and finite random walks
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Agreeing to disagree
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Stochastic common learning
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- On Choosing and Bounding Probability Metrics
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
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