The strategic value of recall

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.013zbMath1279.91025OpenAlexW1978934314MaRDI QIDQ665106

Ron Peretz

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

entropyrepeated gamesde Bruijn sequencesbounded rationalitybounded memorybounded recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

The complexity of interacting automata ⋮ Correlation through bounded recall strategies ⋮ Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory

Cites Work

• Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Repeated games with bounded entropy
• Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
• Elements of Information Theory
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: The strategic value of recall