Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
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Publication:665108
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.005zbMath1279.91052OpenAlexW1994758264MaRDI QIDQ665108
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.005
Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (4)
A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
Uses Software
Cites Work
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
- A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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