Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.005zbMath1279.91052OpenAlexW1994758264MaRDI QIDQ665108

Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism designLindahl allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem

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