Robustness against indirect invasions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010zbMath1279.91032OpenAlexW1997307718MaRDI QIDQ665109

Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsstochastic dynamicsevolutionarily stable strategyMoran processasymptotically stablefixation probabilitydirect invasionevolutionarily stable setindirect invasionneutral mutantneutrally stable strategyrobust against equilibrium entrantsrobust against indirect invasions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation? ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Direct reciprocity in structured populations ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information ⋮ Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations

Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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• Imitation processes with small mutations
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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