Group robust stability in matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.06.004zbMATH Open1279.91119OpenAlexW3124628477MaRDI QIDQ665110

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingacyclicitygroup strategy-proofnesscombined manipulationgroup robust stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Robust stability in matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

Related Items (10)

Unnamed Item ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Complexity study for the robust stable marriage problem ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? ⋮ Group stability in matching with interdependent values ⋮ Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

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