Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.003zbMath1279.91014OpenAlexW2059556323MaRDI QIDQ665116

C. Chameni Nembua

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31249/1/MPRA_paper_31249.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenull player axiomTU-gamesmarginal contributionsingle valued solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (15)

The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik ⋮ Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application ⋮ A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values ⋮ A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure ⋮ Axioms of invariance for TU-games ⋮ Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values ⋮ ``Procedural values for cooperative games ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ Recursive and bargaining values ⋮ The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizations ⋮ On a class of solidarity values ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games

Cites Work

• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Unnamed Item

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