Correlation and relative performance evaluation
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Publication:665451
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.016zbMath1258.91120OpenAlexW2045996657MaRDI QIDQ665451
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.016
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- Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
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