Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
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Publication:665452
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.015zbMath1258.91087OpenAlexW2061156961MaRDI QIDQ665452
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37397
Related Items
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