Fiat-Shamir bulletproofs are non-malleable (in the Random Oracle Model)

DOI10.1007/S00145-024-09525-2MaRDI QIDQ6655876

Akira Takahashi, Chaya Ganesh, Claudio Orlandi, Mahak Pancholi, Daniel Tschudi

Publication date: 27 December 2024

Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

random oracle modelnon-malleabilitybulletproofssimulation-extractabilitynon-interactive zero knowledge proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

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