Common shocks and relative compensation

DOI10.1007/S10436-006-0044-0zbMath1233.91171OpenAlexW2098150044MaRDI QIDQ665735

Martine Quinzii, Michael J. P. Magill

Publication date: 6 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-006-0044-0

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractseffect of common shock on marginal product of effortlikelihood ratio and common shockreward increasing (decreasing) in other agents' outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts ⋮ Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation

Cites Work

• Incomplete markets over an infinite horizon: Long-lived securities and speculative bubbles
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems

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