Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
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Publication:6657644
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01550-9MaRDI QIDQ6657644
Hans Peters, Bas Dietzenbacher, Doudou Gong
Publication date: 6 January 2025
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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