Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6657656
DOI10.1007/s00199-024-01579-4MaRDI QIDQ6657656
Publication date: 6 January 2025
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Stochastic orders
- Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits
- Strategic experimentation with asymmetric players
- Inefficiency of sponsored research
- Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices
- Robust experimentation in the continuous time bandit problem
- Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations
- Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
- Generalized convex inequalities
- On games of strategic experimentation
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Strategic Experimentation
- Breakdowns
- Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
- Career concerns with exponential learning
- Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
- Stochastic Calculus and Applications
- EFFICIENT LEARNING AND JOB TURNOVER IN THE LABOR MARKET
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- Reputation for Quality
- Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
- Cautious stochastic choice, optimal stopping and deliberate randomization
This page was built for publication: Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
