The price of history-independent strategies in games with inter-temporal externalities

DOI10.1007/S13235-024-00555-WMaRDI QIDQ6657679

Xavier Venel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Anna Zseleva

Publication date: 6 January 2025

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamesrepeated gamesstochastic gamesswitching costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• The traveling inspector model
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• Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
• Algorithms for stochastic games ? A survey
• Discrete-Time Controlled Markov Processes with Average Cost Criterion: A Survey
• Computing Stationary Nash Equilibria of Undiscounted Single-Controller Stochastic Games
• The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
• Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs

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