A behavioral test and classification of solution concepts in games
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Publication:6660097
DOI10.1007/s43069-024-00375-zMaRDI QIDQ6660097
Alphonse Fodouop Fotso, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho
Publication date: 10 January 2025
Published in: SN Operations Research Forum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Pillage and property
- Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Full farsighted rationality
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- The Farsighted Stable Set
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- The reciprocity set
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