Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

DOI10.1007/s10436-008-0104-8zbMath1233.91107OpenAlexW2006238834MaRDI QIDQ666293

Naoki Kojima

Publication date: 8 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4050

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimperfect competitioncredit contractlender borrower relationshiptype-dependent reservation utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Credit risk (91G40)

Related Items (1)

On the effects of banks' equity ownership on credit markets

Cites Work

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• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• On countervailing incentives
• Multiproduct Duopolists
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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