Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness

DOI10.1007/S10436-009-0125-YzbMath1233.91164OpenAlexW2036339924MaRDI QIDQ666431

Vinicius Carrasco, João Manoel Pinho de Mello

Publication date: 8 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009-0125-y

zbMATH Keywords

contractual incompletenessrelational lendingrepeated games with asymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A dynamic model of entrepreneurship with borrowing constraints: theory and evidence
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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