Optimal banking with delegated monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2024.105904MaRDI QIDQ6664570

Nemanja Antić, Tai-Wei Hu

Publication date: 16 January 2025

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

costly state verificationbanking regulationsdelegated monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites Work

• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Bailouts and Financial Fragility
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics

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