Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2024.105923MaRDI QIDQ6664585

Debasis Mishra, Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 16 January 2025

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationmultidimensional mechanism designrank-preserving mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites Work

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