Persuading large investors
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Publication:6664598
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105933MaRDI QIDQ6664598
Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Ricardo Alonso
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- Stress tests and information disclosure
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- The social value of information with an endogenous public signal
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Global manipulation by local obfuscation
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
- Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
- Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning*
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
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