Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
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Publication:6665436
DOI10.1007/s00182-024-00907-1MaRDI QIDQ6665436
Yasuo Sasaki, Norimasa Kobayashi
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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