A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00872-1MaRDI QIDQ6665455

Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date: 17 January 2025

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessrisk attitudeNash bargaining solutionrisk dominancebargaining theoryNash demand game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx)

Cites Work

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