Optimal insurance design under asymmetric Nash bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.insmatheco.2024.08.006MaRDI QIDQ6665600

Tao Hu, Jiakun Zheng, Yichun Chi, Zhengtang Zhao

Publication date: 17 January 2025

Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharingwealth effectdeductible insuranceasymmetric Nash bargainingoverinsurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cites Work

• The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
• Nash equilibria in optimal reinsurance bargaining
• Two-person insurance negotiation
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Optimal reinsurance in relation to ordering of risks
• Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Optimal insurance under Wang's premium principle.
• Insurance bargaining under ambiguity
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• S-shaped narrow framing, skewness and the demand for insurance
• A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• The economics of risk and time
• The Bargaining Problem
• Optimal insurance and generalized deductibles
• PRICING IN REINSURANCE BARGAINING WITH COMONOTONIC ADDITIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS
• ON THE OPTIMALITY OF A STRAIGHT DEDUCTIBLE UNDER BELIEF HETEROGENEITY
• The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate

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