Strategic ambiguity in global games

Cites Work

Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
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Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
Information quality and crises in regime-change games
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Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
Agreeing to disagree
Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
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Ambiguous persuasion
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A note on pivotality
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
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Bayesian updating and belief functions
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Condorcet meets Ellsberg
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"Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
Comparative statics with linear objectives: normality, complementarity, and ranking multi-prior beliefs

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