Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
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Publication:6665677
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009MaRDI QIDQ6665677
Jie Zheng, Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
information disclosureBayesian persuasioninformation designall-pay auction contestridge distributiontype correlation
Cites Work
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Information acquisition in conflicts
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Best response equivalence
- Information in conflicts.
- A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
- Pivotal persuasion
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
- Information sharing in private value lottery contest
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
- Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
- Optimal information exchange in contests
- Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- MULTI‐AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Optimal sequential contests
- Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
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