Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.004MaRDI QIDQ6665678

Anders Yeo, Gregory Gutin, Philip R. Neary

Publication date: 17 January 2025

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

normal formstable matchingsassignment constraintsiterated deletion of unattractive alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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