Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
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Publication:6665678
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.004MaRDI QIDQ6665678
Anders Yeo, Gregory Gutin, Philip R. Neary
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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