Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
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Publication:668776
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.006zbMath1482.91082OpenAlexW2886307781WikidataQ129370384 ScholiaQ129370384MaRDI QIDQ668776
Onkar Bhardwaj, John Postl, Elliot Anshelevich, Edith Elkind, Piotr Skowron
Publication date: 19 March 2019
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.006
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