Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00842-7zbMath0875.90276OpenAlexW2044468300WikidataQ127706340 ScholiaQ127706340MaRDI QIDQ671696

Hee-Su Kim

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00842-7

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyAuctionComplementary goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design

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