A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00646-JzbMath0877.90007OpenAlexW1967955282MaRDI QIDQ672546

Yves Sprumont

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00646-j

zbMATH Keywords

strategyproofnessexchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. ⋮ Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

This page was built for publication: A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies