Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00652-IzbMath0900.90196OpenAlexW2034860057WikidataQ123313646 ScholiaQ123313646MaRDI QIDQ672556

Sang-Ho Lee, Jae-Cheol Kim

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00652-i

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationNonzero conjecturesOligopolistic incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

An optional permit system for global pollution control

Cites Work

• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

This page was built for publication: Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures