Continuous time vs. backward induction

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8zbMath0900.90131OpenAlexW2067834887MaRDI QIDQ672679

John R. Conlon

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8

zbMATH Keywords

finite time horizonReputationContinuous timeBackwards inductionPredatory pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Continuous Time Repeated Games

This page was built for publication: Continuous time vs. backward induction