Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-EzbMath0900.90252OpenAlexW1990357668MaRDI QIDQ672686

S. Rao Aiyagari, Dan Peled

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-e

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationProportional taxesSequential majority votingUtilitarian government

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Voting in a stochastic environment: the case of two groups

Cites Work

• Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
• The Optimal Linear Income-tax
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