Seller surplus in first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00725-3zbMath0900.90242OpenAlexW1968130192WikidataQ127396168 ScholiaQ127396168MaRDI QIDQ672758

Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00725-3

zbMATH Keywords

First price auctionRisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

Cites Work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers