Horizontal equity and stability when the number of agents is variable in the fair division problem

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00718-0zbMath0900.90261OpenAlexW1998961876MaRDI QIDQ672776

François Maniquet

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00718-0

zbMATH Keywords

ConsistencyEqual Income Walrasian ruleFair division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction

Cites Work

• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• A characterization of the Walras rule
• Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies

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