Rank-based choice correspondences
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Publication:673207
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00877-4zbMath0879.90011OpenAlexW2078671229MaRDI QIDQ673207
Publication date: 28 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00877-4
Related Items (5)
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules
Cites Work
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- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
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- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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