Is there a tragedy of a common central bank?

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(96)00939-6zbMath0900.90138WikidataQ57787442 ScholiaQ57787442MaRDI QIDQ673258

Matthias G. Raith, Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic gamesEuropean central bankPolicy coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (4)

DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU ⋮ Debt redemption fund and fiscal incentives ⋮ Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia ⋮ The accomplishment of the Maastricht criteria with respect to initial debt

Cites Work

• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach
• Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives
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