On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00891-9zbMath0900.90008MaRDI QIDQ673297

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityIncentive compatibilityTruth demandant mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism ⋮ Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

Cites Work

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• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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