Consistency and cautious fictitious play
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Publication:673692
DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00819-4zbMath0900.90423OpenAlexW2168281471MaRDI QIDQ673692
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Publication date: 28 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3198694
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Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Belief affirming in learning processes
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
- Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- The Evolution of Conventions
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