Incentive compatibility without compensation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00528-AzbMath0875.90232OpenAlexW2051008071MaRDI QIDQ674234

Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00528-a

zbMATH Keywords

Incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof
• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Incentives in the Generalized MDP Procedure for the Provision of Public Goods
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
• Convex Analysis
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

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