Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0981-4zbMath1397.91422OpenAlexW2299089413MaRDI QIDQ680950

Marcia Leon, Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo, Rafael F. Santos

Publication date: 29 January 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0981-4

zbMATH Keywords

speculative attacksleveragedebt crisispartial default

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites Work

• Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation
• INFLATION TARGETING WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises