Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0945-0zbMath1398.91445OpenAlexW2279610818MaRDI QIDQ680963

Florian Kirsch, Ronald Rühmkorf

Publication date: 29 January 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74636

zbMATH Keywords

sovereign debtbailoutsovereign defaultself-fulfilling runs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (4)

Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises ⋮ Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications ⋮ The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk

Cites Work

• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
• A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles

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