On the sovereign debt paradox

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0971-6zbMath1398.91447OpenAlexW2277564855MaRDI QIDQ680965

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis

Publication date: 29 January 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/118296/13/118296.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

lack of commitmentsovereign riskreputation debt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Credit risk (91G40)

Related Items (3)

Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks: a normative approach ⋮ On recursive utilities with non-affine aggregator and conditional certainty equivalent ⋮ Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises

Cites Work

• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Endogenous credit limits with small default costs
• Solving the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle With Financial Frictions
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
• A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles
• Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt
• Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets

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