Liquid price of anarchy

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_1zbMath1403.91157arXiv1511.01132OpenAlexW2964281423MaRDI QIDQ681835

Michal Feldman, Yossi Azar, Alan Roytman, N. V. Gravin

Publication date: 13 February 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.01132

zbMATH Keywords

auctionssocial welfare functionpure Nash equilibrialiquid welfare objective function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings ⋮ Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ Autobidding with constraints ⋮ The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

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