Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4zbMath1403.91177OpenAlexW2746352219MaRDI QIDQ681843

Tao Xiao, Pinyan Lu

Publication date: 13 February 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4

zbMATH Keywords

multi-item auctionsbudget constrained agentsliquid welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (4)

A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings ⋮ Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

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