Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0192-2zbMath1407.91150OpenAlexW2508742120MaRDI QIDQ682462

Nadide Banu Olcay

Publication date: 2 February 2018

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0192-2

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentivesdynamic contractsprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

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