New axioms for immediate acceptance
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Publication:682464
DOI10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0zbMath1407.91179OpenAlexW2521998273MaRDI QIDQ682464
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0
Related Items (3)
New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
Cites Work
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Making just school assignments
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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